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Foreword 
In its research, consulting activities and training courses the German Development 
Institute (DIE) has focused on developing strategies, approaches and instruments to cope 
with emerging global development problems. In particular, three global challenges are 
widely addressed in our the DIE´s work: First, globalization has changed the character of 
development problems as such. Increasing interdependency of local problems like poverty 
and violent conflict has led to the emergence of complex global problems, which only can 
be dealt with through collective action. Secondly, new state and non-state actors are more 
and more influencing global politics. Thus, cooperation patterns in international politics 
are changing. Thirdly, multilateral institutions and fora are needed in order to resolve 
global problems collectively. If this shall be successful, a fundamental reform of the 
present global governance architecture is required. 
Against this background DIE´s work aims at contributing to find constructive solutions to 
global challenges. Therewith, special attention is given to a new group of actors, the 
“emerging powers of the South” (Anchor countries). According to DIE´s definition the 
group of anchor countries comprises large developing countries, which differ from 
typically “smaller” developing countries with regard to their economic size, their regional 
and global power as well as their potential to endanger or stabilize their regional and/or 
global environment.1 Since 2004 DIE has published on economic, political and social 
developments of anchor countries as well as their role in regional and global politics. This 
series of DIE Discussion Papers is continued with the present work of Sascha Müller-
Kraenner. He focuses on China´s and India´s foreign policies, which have been subject to 
major changes due to the countries´ increasing demand of energy resources. These 
emerging foreign energy policies are fundamentally contributing to a geopolitical shift in 
global politics and to changing North-South-relations. For instance, in order to meet their 
demands in the energy sector, both anchor countries have been enhancing their relations 
with resource rich countries in Africa. In consequence, South-South cooperation is 
strongly enforced and the role of developing countries in global politics strengthened. In 
the context of DIE´s work on global governance issues and anchor countries this 
Discussion Paper contributes to a better understanding of current global changes relevant 
to the solution of global problems such as scarce energy resources. 
Bonn, 2 July 2008 Julia Leininger 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The group of anchor countries comprises Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
  
Abstract 
This article aims at analyzing the changing energy foreign policies of the Anchor countries 
China and India. Both countries´ economies are growing at an unprecedented pace. Due to 
high economic growth based on rapid industrialisation the energy consumption of both 
countries is rising fast. Against this background it is explored how the quest for energy 
security has transformed both countries’ foreign policies. In fact, energy and, to an 
increasing extent, climate change, have become defining elements of both countries’ 
foreign policy as well as of the international context in which they find themselves. A new 
“energy foreign policy” which transforms the character of existing geopolitical rivalries is 
emerging. Outside actors such as the European Union must react to these developments 
when shaping their policy responses. International institutions and governance structures 
have to adapt to take into account the growing weight of China, India and other emerging 
economies. Last but not least, energy security and climate change considerations should 
be merged into an integrated sustainable energy policy. 
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Introduction 
Over the past five years, the growing economic and demographic weight of China, India 
and other emerging economies has led to an impressive shift in the status of those 
countries regionally as well as globally. The foreign policy of both China and India is 
rapidly changing.  Energy security and climate change are defining elements of this shift 
from being emerging economy to becoming emerging power, both regionally and more 
and more of a global scope. China’s and India’s international partners, not least the 
European Union, have to re-orient their foreign policy strategies accordingly. 
China’s and India’s economies are growing at an unprecedented pace. Due to high 
economic growth based on rapid industrialisation the energy consumption of both 
countries is rising fast. Both countries have joined the group of the world’s biggest 
importers of oil and gas. China relies on its state energy companies to access new 
resources at home and abroad. India’s energy sector is mainly privatised. However, India’s 
government plays an important role in politically supporting the international expansion of 
its energy sector. 
The following article explores how the quest for energy security has transformed both 
countries’ foreign policies. In fact, energy and, to an increasing extent, climate change, 
have become defining elements of both countries’ foreign policy as well as of the 
international context in which they find themselves. A new “energy foreign policy” which 
transforms the character of existing geopolitical rivalries is emerging. 
Outside actors such as the European Union must react to these developments when 
shaping their policy responses. International institutions and governance structures have to 
adapt to take into account the growing weight of China, India and other emerging 
economies. Last but not least, energy security and climate change considerations should 
be merged into an integrated sustainable energy policy. 
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1 Energy trends for China and India2 
The economies of China and India are booming and their increasing energy demand is not 
only transforming the world’s energy markets but also changing the geopolitical setting. 
Trends for China 
Following its economic development, China’s demand for energy, particularly oil, has 
skyrocketed. Industrialization and improvement in living standards have entailed a surge 
in energy consumption. Between 1993 and 2006, China’s oil consumption nearly doubled 
from 2.9 million barrels per day (b/d) to 7 million, representing an annualized growth rate 
of 7 % (EIA 2005; EIU 2006). The Chinese government estimates that the demand for 
energy will double from 2005 to 2015. Estimates from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) are more cautious but also expect dramatic increases of energy demand. 
In order to meet increased demand for oil, China has been a net oil importing nation since 
1993, overtaking Japan in 2003 to become the world’s second largest oil consumer after 
the United States (EIU 2006). In 2004, 40 % of oil supply in China was imported. The 
2004 IEA report estimates that by 2030, the proportion of imported oil will exceed 70 % 
of domestic demand (IEA 2004). The increasing energy demand from China – and India to 
a certain degree – has often been blamed as one of the major drives behind the current and 
future high oil prices. While the debate over the degree of the “China effect” on escalating 
oil prices continues, statistics show that China single-handedly contributed to 25 % of the 
incremental world demand for primary oil between 1998 and 2003 (IEA 2004). China is 
one of the world’s most “oil intensive” economies and uses an above average amount of 
oil per unit of economic production. 
Despite the surging demand, domestic supply of oil has been a disappointment. New 
sources in the Western and Southern provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet have 
underperformed. Off-shore production will remain controversial as long as competing 
claims with neighbouring nations on maritime borders are not settled. Between 1993 and 
2002, the oil consumption increased from 2.9 b/d to 5.4 million b/d, while domestic oil 
production only grew from 2.9 million b/d to 3.4 million b/d (Downs 2004). The existing 
oil production capacity is also deteriorating from maturing3 without new domestic oil 
fields large enough to meet its current and future energy needs. In the meantime, not only 
the absolute quantity but also the significance of oil and gas relative to other energy 
sources will increase – the share of energy mix for oil and natural gas is projected to 
increase from 25 % and 3 % in 2000 to approximately 27 % and 7 % by 2030 (Downs 
2004). As China becomes increasingly dependent on imported oil, it will inevitably 
increase its exposure to the price volatility of the energy market. 
China is, by far, the world’s biggest producer of coal. In 2004, coal production reached 
almost two billion tons which amounts to 42 % of world production. Coal mining as well 
                                                 
2 All numbers, if not otherwise stated, come from: International Energy Agency (2006).  
3 Out of the total crude oil production at 3.6 million b/d, a single field in Daqing accounts for 
approximately 900,000 b/d of China’s domestic crude oil production. Daqing has been in operation 
since 1963, however, and its production fell around 5 % in 2004 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
cabs/china.html). 
 Sascha Müller-Kraenner 
 German Development Institute 4 
as coal based electricity production leads to immense environmental and health problems. 
Air quality in China’s Northeast, including the capital city of Beijing, has deteriorated 
accordingly. China’s State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) estimates that the 
financial equivalent of those environmental damages is already outgrowing annual 
economic growth. Modernising China’s coal sector is a major challenge and will need 
both international support as well as new innovative financing schemes on an international 
scale. The upcoming UN climate negotiations in Bali provide an opening for the financing 
of technology transfer of a much larger scale than previously seen. 
The future of China’s – and for that matter India’s – coal is one of the determining factors 
for the future of the world’s climate. If both nations continue to base their energy 
economies on coal, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) greenhouse 
gas stabilisation target can only be achieved if new “carbon capture and storage” (CCS) 
technologies are applied to prevent the CO2 (carbon dioxide) from burning coal to enter 
the atmosphere. As no one should expect that either nation gives up their only cheap 
domestic energy resource, technology transfer and innovative financing mechanisms to 
bring them to emerging economies on a large scale have to be a central element of the 
emerging post-Kyoto climate agreement. 
China’s natural gas strategy is motivated mainly by the country’s air quality problems. 
The leadership in Beijing seems to be willing to supplement part of its cheap domestic 
coal in its electricity sector through imported natural gas. Until the late Nineties, natural 
gas played a minor role in China’s energy mix as domestic resources are limited. In the 
medium term, natural gas may be imported from Russia and Kazakhstan. The necessary 
pipeline infrastructure is under development. Some domestic production, both on and off-
shore, will supplement the country’s natural gas strategy. 
Nuclear power will continue to play a minor role for China’s electricity production. 
Today’s nuclear power plants cover 1.5 % of the country’s primary energy demand. China 
plans to build 30 additional nuclear reactors until 2020 which will double this amount to 
3 %. The role of nuclear power in China’s energy mix is strategic in character. Nuclear 
power can provide “clean” electricity when other sources of electricity, as old coal 
powered plants, have to be shut down for air quality reason. The nuclear fuel cycle in 
which China’s civilian nuclear plants are included, is closely linked with the country’s 
nuclear weapon’s program. 
Reliable energy supply has become more and more of a problem for China’s growing 
economy. Chinese companies complain about electricity black outs. During the summer, 
factories in urban conglomerates such as Beijing or Shanghai sometimes only work over 
night when electricity is not being used for millions of air conditioning units. China 
therefore intends to build a system of national reserves, similarly to the one that the 
Western member states of the International Energy Agency started to develop after the oil 
crises of the Seventies and Eighties. The difference however, is that China’s system will 
remain purely national and contribute little to regional stability should a price or supply 
crisis hit its neighbours. 
The potential for energy saving through the application of modern technological 
equipment and modernisation of old energy efficient buildings is enormous. New 
framework legislation for renewable energies is intended to transform China into a world 
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leader for solar thermal and geothermal energies, making China a serious competitor for 
European producers of renewable energy technology such as Germany. 
In 2004, China already contributed 16.5 % of global CO2 emissions (Yale Center for 
Environmental Law & Policy 2005). China will soon overtake the US as the world’s major 
emitter. The IEA has estimated that this might already happen in 2007 although energy 
consumption numbers for the Chinese economy are highly unreliable and based on rough 
estimates of factors such as oil imports and domestic coal production. The IEA estimates 
that China’s contribution to the world’s CO2 emissions could rise up to 40 % of global 
emissions by 2050. The trajectory of China’s energy demand is therefore a determining 
factor for any future climate change scenarios. 
Trends for India 
India’s rise as one of the world’s major energy consumers shows many parallels to China. 
India was the fifth largest consumer of oil in the world during 2006 according to Energy 
Information Agency (EIA 2007). The Indian government estimates that the country’s 
energy consumption will rise 50 % by 2015 based on 2005 levels. Similarly to China, 
reliable energy supply has become a limiting factor for the future development of India’s 
economy, both for its emerging industry as for the country’s rural development. 
India’s domestic coal reserve reaches 101,903 million tons with an annual production of 
over 400 million tons. While some coal is still being imported from Australia, Indonesia 
and South Africa, vast majority of the domestic demand is met with domestic production 
(EIA 2007).4 However, India, like China, faces sharp rise in oil consumption despite 
stagnant oil production levels. As a result, 70 % of the oil consumed in India must be 
imported, mainly from the Middle East. The IEA foresees that by 2030 oil imports will 
rise to 90 % and gas imports to 40 % to meet India’s energy demand. 
India still has one of the lowest CO2 emission levels per capita. The Indian government 
has therefore steadfastly opposed any binding reduction commitments in the ongoing 
negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate regime. However, India has a developed renewable 
energy sector, based both on traditional and modern technologies. India’s wind power 
industry is one of the world’s technological leaders. India is one of the top five wind 
energy generating countries along with Germany, the United States (US), Denmark, and 
Spain (Herbert et al. 2006). 
In the past few years, India has signed several long-term oil and gas delivery contracts 
with neighbouring countries in South and Central Asia, one of them being Iran. However, 
any land based gas transport from Iran would have to cross Pakistan, India’s geopolitical 
rival. A gas deal with Iran would also antagonise the US. 
India relies mainly on the international engagement of its private energy sector. Other than 
China’s national oil companies and European or US based multinationals, India’s private 
energy companies are seriously undercapitalised. India could access international 
development funding for regional energy development projects, however not for the 
                                                 
4 In 2004, India’s estimated domestic coal consumption was 478.2 million tons, among which 443.7 
million tons were supplied domestically. 
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international expansion of its energy companies. This has lead to a close cooperation with 
Chinese efforts in Africa and Southeast Asia. Recently, the government has also started to 
back up the international engagement of its private energy companies with public 
diplomacy, although without the financial incentives that the Chinese provide to resource 
rich clients.  
In 2005, India signed a far reaching energy cooperation agreement with the US (Chipaux 
2006). The agreement still has to be ratified by both countries’ parliaments and has 
therefore not yet entered into force. It contains provisions for technology cooperation and, 
most prominently, in the area of nuclear technology. After having tested nuclear weapons 
in the early Nineties, India was cut off from nuclear fuel and technology supply as part of 
an international embargo. This embargo might end if the “Nuclear Suppliers Group”, a 
club that contains most country’s that use nuclear technology, agrees to lift it. As is the 
case with China, India’s military and civilian nuclear development is closely linked. Even 
after the Indian-US nuclear agreement, military installations will still be excluded from 
international controls. It is not clear yet which elements of India’s fuel cycle will be 
transparent to the international community and which will remain secret under military 
control. 
2 China’s and India’s new energy diplomacy 
China’s integration into the global economy has led to a transformation of its foreign 
policy (Wacker 2006; Scholvin 2007). Traditionally China has tried to remain self 
sufficient and mainly relied on domestic energy resources to drive its centrally planned 
economy. Since the economic liberalisation of the Eighties, energy consumption has 
dramatically increased and domestic supply cannot cover domestic demand anymore. 
China’s economic as well as political rise is leading to tensions with its neighbours in the 
region as well as with other actors on the global political stage. The build up of China’s 
army coincides with the re-orientation of China’s foreign policy towards securing access 
to energy and mineral resources (Economist 2007). 
China’s new energy foreign policy – Between fear and self-confidence 
Despite China’s efforts to diversify its sources of energy supply, nearly half of China’s 
imported oil came from the Middle East in 2005, with Saudi Arabia – a close ally of the 
US – accounting for 17 % in the first quarter (EIA 2005). The majority of these imports 
are transported via sea routes patrolled by the US navy. China therefore fears physical 
disruptions of its oil suppliess, particularly by a deliberate US intervention (Downs 2004). 
In effect, China depends on the US to preserve stability in the Middle East and to secure 
the communication lines that run through Malacca Strait. Chinese energy analysts warn of 
an “energy containment” (Downs 2004) strategy against China during a possible Sino-
American conflict over issues like Taiwan. Furthermore, the general political instability in 
the Middle East calls for diversifying energy sources to maintain a steady flow of energy 
supply. 
As Middle Eastern oil has to be imported along vulnerable shipping lines, the government 
in Beijing supports a diversification strategy that includes oil and gas imports via land 
based pipelines from Russia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. China’s alliance building 
China’s and India’s emerging energy foreign policy 
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with neighbours can to a large extent be explained through an energy import perspective. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), an economic and military alliance that 
includes China, Russia and the Central Asian nations, is a cornerstone of China’s 
emerging energy foreign policy. The government in Beijing encourages its state energy 
companies to invest in new cross-border energy projects and a trans-Asian energy 
infrastructure. 
However, China’s energy rich neighbour, Russia, is also perceived as an unreliable 
supplier. Many of Russia’s energy supply promises have gone unfulfilled with the price of 
Russian oil imports quadrupling in 2005 from the previous year while the actual delivery 
fell short by 8 million tons from the promised delivery of 15 million tons. China is also 
wary of Russia’s aggressive and unpredictable oil diplomacy that often caters to the 
Kremlin’s political and economic aspirations. In the past, the plans for constructing 
pipelines from Russia’s Angarsk in the Far East to link with existing infrastructure at 
Daqing fell through when Yukos, the oil company representing Russia in the negotiations, 
went bankrupt in 2004 under the Kremlin’s political pressures. The alternative plan to 
deliver crude oil from East Siberia to the Pacific was subsequently proposed by Transneft, 
Russia’s government backed pipeline monopoly. Up to as late as July 2006, Russia was 
still tantalizing Japanese and Chinese lobbyists with different pipeline routes, extracting as 
much benefit as possible from the energy agreement. The recent energy cut-offs to 
Ukraine and Belarus most likely did further undermine Russia’s reliability in the eyes of 
the Chinese officials. 
Given China’s uncomfortable dependence on the US and Russia, and lack of opportunity 
in the traditional oil fields in the Middle East, the government has intensified efforts to 
diversify imports. As a latecomer in the world energy market, China’s unpopular energy 
investments in some of the oil-rich “rogue” states such as Iran, Sudan, Burma and 
Venezuela (Collier 2005), have spurred international criticism. However, China’s sub-
prime investments that exacerbate its relations with the Western countries and undermine 
UN sanctions are largely inevitable. “In most parts of the world where the biggest 
[energy] opportunities are, the Western majors are already there,” says Philip Andrews-
Speed, a China energy expert at Scotland’s University of Dundee in Edinburgh. In 
addition to the premium that Chinese companies often pay for energy asset acquisitions, 
China’s scramble for energy investment opportunities could undermine the vision for 
becoming a responsible global power (Lelyveld 2006). 
China, however, has not given up on the Middle East as a future source of oil imports. In 
April 2005, China’s President Hu Jintao visited Saudi-Arabia for the first time. Earlier that  
same year, in January 2005, the Saudi King Abdullah had visited China on his first ever 
trip outside the Middle East region. In the last years, China has developed into one of the 
most important customers of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries and into a 
strategic alternative to European and American customers. Tellingly, the title of a major 
energy conference in Dubai, January 2006, was “Look East”. America still dominates the 
security arrangements at the Gulf, but China’s influence is rising. 
When Hu Jintao came to Washington, DC in May 2005, the oil price had just passed the 
US$ 70/barrel mark. Energy analysts agree that China’s entrance into the world energy 
market is the determining factor of sustainable oil price increases. China and the US have 
become competitors on the world energy market. This new competition for resources 
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overlaps with a more general, emerging economic and political rivalry. Both nations are 
their respective most important trade partners but also compete for dominance in East Asia 
and increasingly on the global stage. The US navy still controls the sea lines in the Indian 
and Pacific oceans, including coastal waters that are essential trade routes for China’s 
economy. US diplomats have started to criticise China’s “mercantilistic” energy policy 
that tries to secure energy resources through long-term delivery contracts. The US 
government is advocating a liberalised world energy market where its private companies 
can compete on a level playing field. China argues that this playing field is strongly biased 
towards American interests, as the US has unchallenged political leverage in many oil 
producing regions such as with the Arab Gulf states. 
The leadership in Beijing has coined the term of China’s “peaceful rise”, implying that 
neighbours and the global community do not have to be afraid that the new economic 
hegemon strives for a dominating role in regional politics too (Downs 2004). 
In its East Asia neighbourhood, China competes with Japan and South Korea for resources 
(Gu / Kupfer 2006). The Sino-Japanese relationship is characterised by a mixture of 
resource and territorial conflicts over disputed high sea waters between both countries. 
Territorial conflicts around potential off-shore oil and gas fields exist between China and 
almost all its neighbours, including Vietnam and the Philippines. 
China’s relationship with the countries of South and Southeast Asia is less antagonistic 
(Gu / Kupfer 2006; Shambaugh 2005). China traditionally imports a significant amount of 
its oil from Indonesia. A new land pipeline − that brings the added advantage to avoid the 
Malakka sea route – will bring oil from Myanmar to China. India and China have started 
to coordinate the investment strategies of their state and private energy companies abroad, 
both in the Central Asian region as towards Iran and in far away places like Africa. On 
nuclear technology however, China continues to cooperate with Pakistan. 
Central Asia 
Central Asia has increasingly become a corner stone of China’s energy security policy. On 
the diplomatic side, China has emphasized regional cooperation that encompasses Russia 
and Central Asia on important energy issues. Out in the oil fields, Chinese national oil 
companies continue to compete fiercely for multi-billion dollar deals to acquire and 
develop oil reserves. The proximity of the oil fields and relatively weak US presence in 
the region make Central Asia an attractive energy supplier whose energy interests have not 
already been dominated by major western oil companies. Compared to China’s regional 
competitor Russia or the politically unstable Middle East, Central Asia could effectively 
diversify its energy sources and better absorb supply shocks that could threaten China’s 
economic development.  
For energy rich Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan, Chinese investment has been viewed as a potential leverage against 
Russian control over their access to international energy market. As the Chinese national 
oil companies construct gas pipelines from the landlocked Central Asia, the region’s 
reliance on Russian pipelines is likely to diminish, thereby undermining Russia’s control 
over the region’s energy resources and economic development. As such, China’s 
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aggressive energy policy may jeopardize China’s relations with Russia, who is reclaiming 
its international influence in times of high oil prices. 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
One example of such increased regional cooperation is the SCO. SCO was formed in 2001 
by the leaders of China, Russia and the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan primarily to deal with terrorism and separatist threats in the 
region. Energy policy and the development of a common infrastructure have become a 
recent focus of activity. Inside the SCO, China and Russia are the two dominating players. 
The relationship between both countries can be described as an uneasy mix of cooperation 
and competition for regional influence. 
For China, however, oil and hopes for turning the old Silk Road across Central Asia into 
an “energy road” has increasingly become a priority (Fairclough 2006). Some experts, 
including Lieutenant General William Odom, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, say 
that SCO serves as a vehicle for Russia and China to assert their influence in Central Asia 
and curb US access to region’s vast energy supplies (Beehner 2006). Others, like David 
Wall at the University of Cambridge’s East Asia Institute, speculate that an expanded and 
militarized SCO will essentially become a new Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) with bombs (Beehner 2006). The most recent SCO summit in August 
2007 further unnerved the US and other major oil importers. The Russian president 
Wladimir Putin explicitly talked of SCO’s role as an “energy club,” and India sent its oil 
minister as a representative at the meeting. Further attracting media attention was the 
presence of Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who argued for Iran’s membership 
in the SCO and a stronger cooperation against “domineering powers” of the US. Currently 
the third-largest supplier of crude oil to China, Iran dangled its oil reserves as an excellent 
inducement for cooperation (Fairclough 2006). The competition between China, Russia, 
and other regional powers as India and Iran, for dominance inside of the organisation 
might however hamper its future development into a strong and effective alliance. 
China’s Africa policy 
China’s new Africa policy has been widely discussed in the Western press and 
development politics. China has been blamed to subordinate democracy and human rights 
to its economic interests and to back up unsavoury regimes like Sudan with foreign 
investments as well as by selling weapons and providing diplomatic support. On the other 
hand, China has become Africa’s biggest donor of development aid. African countries like 
Angola have replaced loans from international donors, e. g. the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), that come with a whole range of governance conditions, with grants from 
China, that come with no strings attached. Most Chinese development aid goes to 
countries where Chinese companies invest in resource extraction or other economic 
interests. Chinese development cooperation and diplomacy has transformed the playing 
field on the African continent and has pushed other international donors to the side. James 
Traub of the New York Times writes: “China's Africa policy shows that globalization is 
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increasingly divorced from Westernization. We have grown accustomed to the idea that 
Africa needs us; it's time to recognize that we, like China, need Africa.”5 
By 2010, producing nations in Western Africa will account for one of every three new 
barrels of oil pumped worldwide. Additional oil will come from Angola, Sudan and other 
nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo, although political instability still makes 
effective resource extraction difficult. By 2015, China’s imports from Africa might 
amount to a third of its demand, significantly diminishing its dependence from the Middle 
East.6 Chinese engagement in African countries can be illustrated with the following two 
examples: 
China has become the most active international investor and trading partner for Sudan. 
Although Chinese companies are not active in the war torn Western province of Darfour, 
China has come under heavy criticism for backing up the Islamic regime in Khartoum. 
The China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) holds 40 % state in a consortium to 
develop large fields and is building a 215 million USD export terminal in Sudan, whose 
regime has fallen under international criticism over the genocide in Darfour. Currently, 
Sudan is China’s largest overseas production base (Bezlova 2005). China has long 
opposed UN sanctions against Sudan for its human rights violations and human rights 
activist argue that oil profits are sustaining the regime (Bezlova 2005). CNPC has also 
been accused of providing arms to the Sudanese government in exchange for access to oil. 
Recently, however, Chinese diplomacy has played a helpful role in reaching a 
compromise on a new UN security force for Darfour. China’s foreign policy elite is 
clearly anxious to avoid conflicts about China’s human rights record that might spoil the 
nation’s image abroad, most importantly on the newly won African markets. 
Angola has become Africa’s fastest growing economy with growth rate of 35.3 % in 2006 
alone.7 That growth stems from a series of big oil discoveries some 100 miles offshore, 
which have increased the country's oil production tenfold since the mid-1970s, to 1.5 
million b/d in 2006. Next year, Angola is expected to reach two million barrels daily and 
by 2011, 2.6 million barrels, the equivalent of Kuwait's output. But Angola is finding itself 
at the crossroads of today's energy geopolitics. It has become the latest stage in a global 
rivalry playing out among Western, Russian and Chinese oil companies. In 2006, it joined 
the OPEC, which has been paring global supplies to keep prices from falling below 
US$ 50 a barrel. China has identified Angola as a promising source in its rush for energy 
resources, providing billions in loans and development aid in return for favourable 
treatment of its oil interests. Last year, Angola overtook Saudi Arabia as the largest oil 
supplier to the Chinese. It is currently the sixth-biggest exporter to the United States. The 
Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, visited Angola over the summer and announced that China 
had extended another US$ 2 billion to Angola, on top of US$ 1 billion announced a few 
months earlier and the original US$ 2 billion from 2004. Angola was part of a visit that 
comprised seven African nations, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country 
that is just beginning to exploit its oil resources. China is now one of Africa's largest 
customers not only for oil but also for timber, minerals, cotton and other natural resources. 
                                                 
5 An excellently written account of China’s engagement in Africa, most notably in Angola (Traub 2006).  
6 Numbers from: Oil and Gas Journal estimates, as of Jan. 1, 2007. 
7 Source: IMF, quoted from Financial Times, August 10, 2007. 
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China in turn has flooded Africa with cheap consumer goods. The IMF forecasts that 
China's trade with Africa will top US$ 50 billion this year and could reach US$ 100 
billion by 2010. Over the last five years, sub-Saharan Africa's growth rate has almost 
doubled, to 5.8 % from 3 %. Economists attribute much of the increase to trade with China 
and other Asian countries. In November 2006, a first summit with African leaders with 
China’s president Hu Jintao took place. Almost all African leaders – excluding those 
countries that have recognised Taiwan – took part. China announced additional aid to the 
amount of US$ 5 billion in preferential loans and credits over the next three years, 
effectively doubling aid to Africa, while cancelling many outstanding debts. A dozen 
Chinese companies signed agreements for US$ 1.9 billion worth of construction projects 
and investment.8  
James Traub writes: 
“The People's Republic has declared 2006 'the Year of Africa.' The West had its own 
unofficial Year of Africa in 2005, and it is instructive to compare the two. The 
industrial nations conducted a sort of moral crusade, with advocacy organizations 
exposing Africa's dreadful sores and crying shame on the leaders of wealthy nations 
and those leaders then heroically pledging, at the G8 meeting in July 2007, to raise 
their development assistance by billions and to open their markets to Africa. Once 
everyone had gone home, the aid increase turned out to be largely ephemeral and 
trade reform merely wishful. China, by contrast, offers a pragmatic relationship 
between equals: the 'strategic partnership’ promised in China's African policy is 
premised on 'mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity.’ And the benefits 
are very tangible.” (Traub 2006) 
India’s energy diplomacy 
Since its independence, India has traditionally been less isolationalist than China. In the 
Cold War, India emerged as a leader of the non-alignment movement. Since the Cold war 
is over, this loose movement of countries has lost its importance and India its traditional 
role. Since then, India has emerged as a regional hegemon but with no recognisable 
strategy beyond the shores of the sub-continent. India’s supreme foreign policy objective 
has always been to isolate neighbouring Pakistan. Energy security considerations are 
however emerging as a second theme of Indian diplomacy. Over the last decade, India did 
support anti-Taliban fighters in Afghanistan to gain political influence in a country that 
could serve as a bridge to energy rich Central Asia. Although India is negotiating a far 
reaching energy agreement with the US, parallel negotiations with Iran to build new oil 
and gas export lines, are being advanced. India has lagged behind China in exploring 
energy investments on the African continent, but recently private companies from India, 
backed by New Delhi’s diplomacy have shown a flurry of activities in diverse African 
countries. More so even than China, India plans to expand the use of nuclear power for 
electricity production. Until recently, access to nuclear fuel has been the limiting factor for 
India’s nuclear power program. After having tested nuclear weapons in the early Nineties, 
India and Pakistan were both put under an international embargo that did not allow either 
country to import nuclear technology and fuels from the influential “nuclear suppliers 
                                                 
8 Source: IMF, quoted from Financial Times, August 10, 2007. 
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group”. Now, as part of the newly envisaged India-US energy agreement, this ban might 
be lifted. 
Recently, Russia and India have started to cooperate more closely on energy issues (New 
York Times 2007). India wants to expand its access to investment in Russia's vast oil 
reserves. On the agenda is a proposed joint venture to explore for oil in Siberia. India's 
US$ 1 billion stake in an existing project called Sakhalin 1 is this country's largest foreign 
investment. Reliance Industries, an Indian energy company, has floated the idea of 
investing in a Russian refinery. According to Indian officials, Russia has also expressed an 
interest in investing in a pipeline that would carry natural gas from Iran through Pakistan 
to India. The Bush administration has repeatedly expressed reservations about the project. 
Far more important, analysts pointed out, Moscow is already New Delhi's largest defence 
partner. Paradoxically, when the India-United States nuclear deal opens the door for New 
Delhi to buy nuclear technology to expand its civilian nuclear program, Russia may 
benefit. India would be allowed to purchase nuclear fuel, reactors and other technology on 
the world market, but only after it gained approval from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, which regulates international atomic energy trade. Russia is already building two 
nuclear reactors in this country and is prepared to do more. 
So far, China and India have only cooperated sporadically when their interests were in 
alignment, and not on a strategic level. That however, could change in the future. China 
and India have agreed a kind of “non-aggression” pact between both countries’ 
internationally active energy companies. Both countries also opposed a recent climate 
change debate in the UN Security Council that was put on the agenda by the Council’s 
British Presidency. Both assert the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle 
in the UN climate negotiations. In international politics in general, they both insist on the 
“principle of non-interference”. China evoked this principle in the case of Sudan, although 
Chinese diplomacy became rather involved in addressing the challenge behind the scenes. 
3 Regional and global challenges 
China and India have recently started to play a more active role in the United Nations 
system and other international institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the International Financing Institutions (IFIs). China positions itself – to quote former US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright – as a “responsible stakeholder” on the world stage. 
India has traditionally been the leader of the non-alignment movement in the UN. Since 
this movement has faded away in the aftermath of the Cold War, India strives to become a 
regional power in the more traditional sense. 
The Western powers, who still dominate the international system, have not yet decided 
whether to integrate China, India and other emerging economies fully into the system of 
international governance or whether to play them off against each other. Sometimes, 
traditional geopolitical thinking still prevails. One major example for that approach is the 
India-US energy agreement that seems to be largely motivated by US intentions to balance 
China’s regional influence by aligning itself with India. Traditionally, US politics in the 
region have relied on India’s geopolitical rival Pakistan. America’s effort to build stronger 
ties with India therefore represents a major shift which can to a large extent be explained 
by Washington’s preoccupation with the rise of China. 
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Governance responses 
Several important international organisations have to decide how to accommodate the 
growing role of China and India on the international stage. 
China is the only developing country which serves as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. Reform of the Council that would include India, Brazil, and maybe 
South Africa, as additional permanent members have been remaining elusive after the 
failure of the recent UN reform summit in 2005. Nevertheless, new initiatives have been 
started at the opening session of the 62th General Assembly of 2007. The Security Council 
has recently started to address non-traditional threats to security, including climate change, 
although China has voiced its opposition to such an expanded definition of security. 
A frequently overlooked UN body, that plays an increasingly important role in governing 
energy related conflicts, is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
UNCLOS and its Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf settle conflicts 
around the extension of a nation’s maritime shelves and borders. Those borders have 
become more important as more and more energy resources are being discovered off-
shore. 
A broader approach to environmental governance on a global scale – considering the 
growing role of China and India with regard to environmental issues – could be taken, if 
existing institutions and treaties would be integrated into a new Global Environmental 
Organisation (GEO) or a coordinating mechanism around the existing United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).9 Energy governance would have to be part of the core 
mission of such a new body. 
Voting rights in the both Bretton Woods organisations, the World Bank and the IMF are 
biased towards Europeans and Americans. Recent efforts to reform the IMF and give more 
shares and voting rights to China and other emerging economies failed, mainly because of 
European resistance. The World Bank is traditionally being headed by an American and 
the IMF by a European. Recent changes in leadership cemented this tradition at least for 
the next five years.  
European governments have advocated a paradigm shift of international energy financing 
from major oil, gas or hydropower projects to renewable energies and energy efficiency. 
This shift will only happen if the main customers of the World Bank and other regional 
development banks go along with it. A reorientation of international energy lending can 
only take place if Chinese lending in Africa or Brazilian lending in South America do not 
compete with such a new approach towards sustainable development. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its sister 
organisation, the IEA have carefully moved to include new members, as most recently 
Mexico and South Korea. Since 2006, the OECD is being led by a Mexican national who 
has announced to open the organisation to newly emerging economies. However, at the 
                                                 
9 The former idea has been diplomatically advanced by France and Germany, with the backing of the EU. 
The latter concept was developed through the Global Environmental Governance project, which was 
coordinated by Yale University, and in which one of the authors (Müller-Kraenner, Sascha) played an 
active role. See also Esty / Ivanova (2002). 
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recent G8 summit, the leaders of the dominating economies mandated the OECD only to 
open a dialogue process with those emerging economies (the so called Heiligendamm 
Process), rather than starting a process towards full membership. Both the OECD and the 
IEA already collect numerous data about China and India. The sister organisations run 
offices in both countries, provide their analytical capabilities and give advice for economic 
reform. Their data on energy production and consumption are widely used and relied 
upon. However, full participation in OECD/IEA remains elusive as long as Western 
governments do not want to share their influence on those organisations. 
The exclusion of the emerging economies from the informal but influential club of the G8 
itself is highly symbolic. The G8 have stopped to represent the world’s major economies. 
Such a forum would have to include China and maybe India or Brazil. The current 
arrangement of informal “G8+5” arrangements, or ad hoc invitations of additional 
countries to the summit’s deliberations, does neither produce results nor enjoy legitimacy. 
The Heiligendamm G8 summit in June 2007 might have been the last occasion when 
China, India and other representatives of emerging powers were willing to wait in the 
anteroom and listen to pre-conceived results of the big 8’s deliberations. 
The G8 Summit 2007 has also asked to “increase transparency, predictability and stability 
of global energy markets”. Most importantly, China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South 
Africa are requested to adopt a set of “Global Energy Security Principles” and to establish 
strategic oil reserves with the assistance of the IEA (G8 Summit Heiligendamm 2007). 
Climate change 
China and India play a central role in the ongoing negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate 
regime. China has or will surpass the US in the coming years as the world’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitter. India’s emissions still lag behind but are rising rapidly. A 
meaningful response to global warming will not be possible if either country will be 
excluded from the post-Kyoto deal. More importantly, from a political perspective, neither 
the US or Japan, nor the Europeans, will sign up to farther reaching greenhouse gas 
reduction commitments if China and India will not also become part of a new global 
treaty. 
Such a deal, however, will be difficult to negotiate. The formal negotiations inside the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will start in Bali 
(Indonesia) in December 2007. Climate change also figures prominently in numerous 
other institutions and discussions that are taking place. Unfortunately, a rational 
framework that integrates all those discussions is not yet in place. The Heiligendamm G8 
Summit has confirmed the centrality of the UN in negotiating a new global agreement. 
This position is broadly shared by the so called “O5” emerging economies (China, India, 
Mexico, Brazil, South Africa) and most other developing countries. However, emerging 
economies will only take up additional commitments if parallel agreements on technology 
transfer, the financing of climate friendly energy infrastructure, and climate change 
adaptation are being reached. 
Michael Jacobs, climate change advisor to the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, 
writes: 
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“The ‘near negotiation’ processes focusing on real energy investment does not yet 
exist.  The UK-initiated Gleneagles Dialogue has so far operated at a general 
discussion level, while various other relevant discussions go on elsewhere – the US-
led Asia Pacific Partnership (AP6 - US, Australia, Japan, China, S Korea, India), the 
IFIs, etc. There is no overall framework. (…) This means, effectively, that there are at 
least seven processes in train – the UNFCCC (which itself has two strands, inside and 
outside the Kyoto Protocol), G8+5, the Gleneagles Dialogue, the UN Secretary 
General’s initiative, the US emitters’ meeting and AP6.  ( … ) Different countries are 
involved in each of these.  Bringing all these processes together in a rational form 
will be extremely difficult, but failure to do so will involve a major waste of effort and 
time.  We are now working very closely with the Germans to seek to do this, and need 
to engage the US, and then Japan and the +5 urgently.” (Jacobs 2007) 
4 Recommendations for the EU’s energy foreign policy towards China 
and India 
Marco Polo was the first European who travelled to China and talked to his European 
compatriots about the marvels of another world. Today, business relationships between 
Europe and China are closer than ever but the political relationship is lacking behind.10 
India still holds a privileged relationship with the United Kingdom and maintains relations 
with the EU through a cooperation agreement from 1994. 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) sets the aim to develop “strategic partnerships” 
(EC 2003) both with China and India. Although the term is ambivalent, and consciously 
so, in general understanding it means a long-term, broad based relationship to mutual 
benefit.11 Very obviously, the EU does not have a coherent China policy (EC 2003). Such 
deficiency should not come as a surprise. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
aimed at coordinating the foreign policy of the EU Member States, is a work in progress.  
It develops in stages and in concentric circles around the European territory. 
However, the EU would be well advised to adopt and implement a coherent China policy 
for a number of reasons. Right now, the EU’s major member states compete for economic 
influence with China without coordinating their trade and export initiatives as part of a 
common bilateral framework. History has repeatedly shown that major changes in the 
balance of power among nations and regions have rarely occurred peacefully. The global 
arena has yet to adjust to the shift in balance of power away from the West to the East 
with the growing emergence of Asian nations, primarily of China and India. As the unique 
and successful example of an integrated regional community and power, the EU has much 
wisdom to share with other members of the global community and much to contribute in 
the construction of a new world order. 
                                                 
10 The sketchy character of the EU’s China strategy is being discussed by the European Commission (EC 
2003). 
11 This is the definition that Germany’s foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier applied when he talked 
about another of the EU’s strategic partnerships (with Russia) at the Munich Security Conference in 
2006 (Steinmeier 2006). 
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China’s role in international organizations is growing and can only continue to grow as the 
world anticipates China to replace Japan as the world’s second largest economy. In the 
United Nations, it holds a permanent seat in the Security Council. In the WTO, China has 
developed into the most prominent player next to the EU and the US. China is an active 
member in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN+3) and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). China’s currency, the Yuan, plays a growing role in both 
Asia’s and the global currency system.  The Chinese government can influence the system 
significantly by controlling exchange rates and by the mere fact that it holds a significant 
part of the US national debt.  China’s active participation is also anticipated and needed in 
a number of significant international treaties as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. 
Given the importance of China’s potential impact in the global arena, it is in the EU’s 
interest to actively involve China as a responsible stakeholder. Both regionally and 
internationally, China has become an important partner to the European Union and others 
in resolving security, economic and governance crises. Ultimately, it is in the EU’s best 
interest as a global power to coordinate a cohesive EU-China policy in conjunction with 
its transatlantic policy and thereby contribute to the global balance of power. 
Both the EU and China have developed strategic partnerships with their common 
neighbour Russia. Both partnerships cover a broad array of security and economic 
interests. Most importantly, however, is Europe’s and China’s common interest in 
Russia’s oil and gas resources. Both China and the EU depend on energy imports from 
Russia. This dependency is projected to grow when other sources of oil and gas imports 
run dry and when all planned infrastructure projects with Russia are being implemented. 
On their summit meeting in September 2006, China and the EU signed a common 
declaration on energy security that mirrors the agreed principles of the G8 summit in St. 
Petersburg. Both sides want to cooperate on new energy technologies, most notably 
renewable energies and CCS, as well as in the creation of common markets. Both partners 
also want to coordinate their actions as customers for energy imports towards third parties 
– again, most notably Russia. 
Until today, Russia’s Eastern and Western pipelines networks are not fully linked. China 
still imports Russian oil by train. However, in the future, competition on access and 
investment in Russia’s energy resources will grow.  If the EU and China, together with 
Russia, do not manage to pool their interests in a cooperative manner, the potential for 
conflict will grow considerably. The European Energy Charter − a framework agreement 
that has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma but in which China possesses an 
observer status − could be used for that purpose (Vertrag über die Europäische 
Energiecharta 1994). 
The US has recently tried to balance China’s rising influence by shifting military and 
technological support to India. Europe’s approach should not be to rely on a system of 
“balance of power” but to offer its unique experience of cooperative problem solving in 
common institutions to this region that is even more fragmented politically than Europe 
was after the Second World War. Energy cooperation could lead the way in that regard, as 
it did in post war Europe when the European Community for Coal and Steel (ECCS) was 
constructed, the first predecessor of today’s European Union. The Northeast Asian region 
is beset with a growing number of challenges, including trans-national environmental 
issues, especially relating to air pollution, which need to be resolved by China and its 
neighbours. The East Asian economic alliance of ASEAN could be a cristallisation point 
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for such an effort. East Asian nations have already started to cooperate on cross border air 
pollution, an issue that is closely related to energy production. Those efforts are based on 
Europe’s agreements on transboundary air pollution that were negotiated under the 
auspices of UN-ECE in the last years of the Cold War. 
European-Chinese relations should be considered to be in a “pre-political stage”. They are 
dominated by the trade and economic policy interests of individual Member States. 
Strategic considerations on China’s future role in the multilateral system and in a Euro-
Asian security structure continue to play a secondary role. In principle, the European 
Union would be China’s partner of choice on the international scene. Without posing a 
security threat to China, The EU carries enough economic and political weight to counter 
balance US and Russian influence in the region.  In the past decade, Europe’s interest has 
mainly focussed on building a strategic relationship with emerging China. However, India 
and other South and East Asian countries should not be forgotten when the EU develops a 
new “Eastern policy“. India, Japan and South Korea are the region’s major democracies 
and should be natural partners for Europe in the region. 
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